亚里士多德解释编—-ON INTERPRETATION

1

First we must define the terms ’noun’ and ’verb’, then the terms ’denial’ and

’affirmation’, then ’proposition’ and ’sentence.’

Spoken words are the symbols of mental experienc e and written words are

the symbols of  spoken words.  Just as all men have  not the same writing,  so

all  men  have  not  the  same  speech  sounds,  but  the  mental  experiences,

which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those  things

of  which  our  experiences  are  the  images.  This  matter  has,  however,  been

discussed  in  my  treatise  about  the  soul,  for  it  belongs  to  an  investigation

distinct from that which lies before us .

As there  are in the mind thoughts  whic h do not  involve truth or fals ity, and

also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech. For truth and

fals ity imply combination and s eparation. Nouns and verbs, prov ided nothing

is  added,  are  like  thoughts  without  combination  or  separation;  ’man’  and

’white’,  as  isolated  terms,  are  not  yet  either  true  or  fals e.  In  proof  of  this,

consider  the  word  ’goat-stag.’  It  has  significanc e,  but  there  is  no  truth  or

fals ity about it, unless ’is’ or ’is  not’ is added, either in the present or in some

other tense.

2

By  a  noun  we  mean  a  sound  significant  by  convention,  which  has  no

reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the

noun ’Fairsteed,’ the part ’steed’ has no significance in and by itself, as in the

phrase  ’fair  steed.’  Yet  there  is  a  difference  between  simple  and  composite

nouns;  for  in  the  former  the  part  is  in  no  way  significant,  in  the  latter  it

contributes to  the meaning of  the  whole, although  it has  not  an independent

meaning.  Thus  in  the  word  ’pirate-boat’  the  word  ’boat’  has  no  meaning

exc ept as part of the whole word.

The limitation ’by convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature

a  noun or name-it  is only s o when it  becomes a symbol;  inarticulate sounds,

suc h  as  those  which  brutes  produce,  are  significant,  yet  none  of  these

constitutes a noun.

The  expression  ’not-man’  is  not  a  noun.  There  is  indeed  no  recognized

term by which we may denote such an expression, for it is not a sentence or a

denial. Let it then be called an indefinite noun.

The  expressions  ’of  Philo’,  ’to  Philo’,  and  so on,  constitute not  nouns,  but

cas es of a noun. The definition of these cases  of a noun is in other respects

the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with ’is’, ’was’, or will

be’, they do not,  as  they  are, form a  proposition either true  or false, and this

the  noun  proper  always  does,  under  these  conditions.  Take  the  words  ’of

Philo  is ’  or  ’of  or  ’of  Philo  is  not’;  these  words  do  not,  as  they  stand,  form

either a true or a false proposition.