亚里士多德解释编—-关于时间的命题

These  awkward  results  and  others  of  the  same  kind  follow,  if  it  is  an

irrefragable  law that  of every  pair  of contradictory  propositions,  whether they

have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or whether

they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other false, and that

there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes place is the outcome

of nec essity. There would  be no need to deliberate or to take  trouble, on the

supposition  that  if  we  should  adopt  a  certain  course,  a  certain  result  would

follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict

an  event  ten  thousand  years  beforehand,  and  another  may  predict  the

reverse;  that  which  was  truly  predicted  at  the  moment  in  the  past  will  of

necessity take place in the fullness of time.

Further,  it  makes no  difference  whether  people have  or have  not actually

made the contradictory statements. For it  is manifest that the circumstances

are not influenced by the fact of an affirmation or denial on the part of anyone.

For events  will not take place or fail to  take place because it was stated  that

they  would  or  would  not  take  place,  nor  is  this  any  more  the  case  if  the

prediction  dates  back  ten  thousand  years  or  any  other  space  of  time.

Wherefore,  if  through  all  time the  nature  of  things  was so c onstituted that  a

prediction  about  an  event  was  true,  then  through  all  time  it  was  necessary

that  that should find  fulfillment; and  with  regard to  all  events, circumstances

have always been such that their occurrence is a matter of necessity. For that

of which someone has said truly that it will be, cannot fail to take place; and of

that which takes place, it was always true to say that it would be.

Yet  this  view  leads  to  an  impossible  conc lusion;  for  we  see  that  both

deliberation and  action  are  causative  with  regard  to  the  future,  and that,  to

speak more generally, in those things which are not continuously actual there

is potentiality in either direction. Such things may either be  or  not be; events

also  therefore  may  either  take  place  or  not  take  place.  There  are  many

obvious  instances of this. It is possible that this  coat may be  cut in half, and

yet it may not be cut in half, but wear out first. In the same way, it is possible

that  it should  not be cut in half; unless this were so, it  would not be possible

that  it  should  wear  out  first.  So  it  is  therefore  with  all  other  events  whic h

possess this k ind of potentiality. It is therefore plain  that  it  is not of  necessity

that  everything  is  or  takes  plac e;  but  in  some  instances  there  are  real

alternatives, in which  case the affirmation is no  more  true and no more false

than the  denial; while some exhibit a predisposition and general  tendency in

one  direction  or  the  other,  and  yet  can  issue  in  the  opposite  direction  by

exc eption.