亚里士多德解释编—-否定之否定命题

The question arises whether an  affirmation  finds its contrary  in  a denial or

in  another  affirmation;  whether  the  proposition  ’every  man  is  just’  finds  its

contrary in the proposition ’no man is just’, or in the proposition ’every man is

unjust’. Take  the  propositions  ’Callias  is  just’,  ’Callias  is  not  just’,  ’Callias  is

unjust’; we have to discover which of these form contraries.

Now if the spok en word corresponds with the judgement of the mind, and if,

in  thought,  that  judgement  is  the  contrary  of  another,  which  pronounces  a

contrary fact,  in the way, for instance,  in  which the judgement ’every man is

just’ pronounces a contrary to  that pronounced by the judgement ’every man

is unjust’, the same must needs hold good with regard to spok en affirmations.

But if, in thought, it is not the judgement which  pronounces a contrary fact

that is the contrary of another, then one affirmation will not find its contrary in

another, but rather  in the  corresponding denial. We  must therefore c onsider

which true judgement is the contrary of the false, that which forms the denial

of the false judgement or that which affirms the contrary fact.

Let me illustrate. There is a true judgement concerning that which is good,

that  it  is  good;  another,  a  false  judgement,  that  it  is  not  good;  and  a  third,

which is distinct, that it is bad. Which of these two is contrary to the true? And

if they are one and the s ame, which mode of expression forms the c ontrary?

It is  an error  to  suppose that judgements  are  to  be defined  as  contrary in

virtue  of  the  fact  that  they  have  contrary  subjects ;  for  the  judgement

concerning a good thing, that it is good, and that concerning a bad thing, that

it is bad, may be one and the same, and whether they are so or not, they both

represent  the truth.  Yet  the s ubjects  here  are  contrary.  But judgements  are

not  contrary  because  they  have  contrary  subjects ,  but  because  they are  to

the c ontrary effect.

Now if we take the judgement that that  whic h is good is good, and another

that it is not good, and if there are at the same time other attributes, which do

not and cannot  belong to the good,  we  must nevertheless refuse to treat  as

the  contraries  of  the  true  judgement  those  which  opine  that  some  other

attribute subsis ts which does not subsist, as  also those that opine that some

other attribute does  not subsist which does subsist, for both these c lasses of

judgement are of unlimited content.

Those judgements must rather  be termed contrary to the true judgements ,

in  which  error  is  present.  Now  these  judgements  are  those  which  are

concerned  with  the  starting  points  of  generation,  and  generation  is  the

passing from one extreme to its opposite; therefore error is a like transition.

Now that which is good is both good and not bad. The first quality is part of

its essence, the second accidental; for it is by accident that it is not bad. But if

that  true judgement is most really true, which concerns  the  subject’s  intrinsic

nature,  then  that  false  judgement  likewise  is  most  really  false,  whic h

concerns its intrinsic nature. Now the judgement that that is good is not good

is  a  false  judgement  concerning  its intrinsic  nature,  the  judgement  that  it  is

bad  is  one  concerning  that  which  is  accidental.  Thus  the  judgement  which

denies  the  true  judgement  is   more  really  false  than  that  which  positively

ass erts the presence of the contrary quality. But it is the man who forms that

judgement which is  contrary to the true  who is most thoroughly deceived, for

contraries  are  among  the  things  which  differ  most  widely  within  the  same

class. If then of the two judgements one is contrary to the true judgement, but

that which is contradictory is the more truly contrary, then the latter, it seems,

is  the  real  contrary.  The  judgement  that  that  which  is  good  is  bad  is

composite.  For  presumably  the  man  who  forms  that judgement  must at the

same time unders tand that that which is good is  not good.